These perceptions can undermine the negotiation process through reactive devaluation. Reactive devaluation occurs when one party subconsciously devalues negotiations being made by the other party, assuming that the concession really won't benefit them, otherwise the other party wouldn't have made it. To avoid this, the authors encourage negotiators to evaluate concessions objectively by their merits, not in response to the negotiator's own fears.
The BATNA Process:
The BATNA process is a two-step process. The first step is for the party to determine all possible options that are available to fulfill their needs, for the particular situation. The second step is to realistically anticipate the other party's alternatives to the situation. Both steps are equally important. Only in this way will the party be able to determine the strength of their best alternative, in relation to the other party's alternative ("BATNA -- Best," 2010).
The prenegotiation analysis and diagnosis is once of the most often overlooked parts of negotiation, according to Zartman (2008); however, it is also the most crucial...
This prenegotiation work is necessary for the negotiation process to be effective and efficient. For the parties involved, it can help them predetermine their power in the negotiation (Buelens & Poucke. 2004).
References
BATNA -- Best alternative. (2010). Retrieved March 11, 2011, from http://www.negotiations.com/articles/best-alternative/.
Buelens, M. & Poucke, D. (Fall 2004). "Determinants of a negotiator's initial opening offer." Journal of Business & Psychology, 19(1). p. 23-36.
Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without giving in (2nd ed.). New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books.
Subramanian, G. (Jan 2007). "Taking BATNA to the next level." Negotiation. p. 7-9.
Thompson, L. & Leonardelli, G. (Aug 2004). "The big bang: The evolution of negotiation research." Academy of Management Executive, 18(3). p. 113-117.
Zartman, W. (2008). "Introduction: Bias, prenegotiation and leverage in mediation." International Negotiation, 13(3). p. 305-310.
